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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHALE RICHARD SCHUBARTH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 200403 61-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from convictions of thirteen counts of securities fraud, seven of 
which were second degree felonies, and six of which were third degree felonies, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000), thirteen counts of selling 
unregistered securities, third degree felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§61-1-7 
and 61-1-21 (2000), four counts of employment of an unlicensed agent, third degree 
felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3 (2000), and one count of conducting a 
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-10-1603 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
la. Did defendant invite any error in the creation of a six-year abeyance term 
when he negotiated for the six-year term to allow him sufficient time to repay more than 
a quarter-of-a-million dollars in restitution? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies to the issue of whether 
defendant invited any error. To the extent this issue requires interpretation of the plea-in-
abeyance statute, '"[t]he proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law.'" State v. 
Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, H 8, 99 P.3d 359 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201). 
lb. Alternatively, was any error in the six-year abeyance term harmless where 
defendant violated the abeyance agreement after only six months, and the six-year term 
was specifically created to benefit defendant? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2. Did the trial court correctly find that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance 
agreement by passing a bad check in Nevada when defendant admitted that he had paid a 
fine to satisfy the charge? 
Standard of Review: A '"trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly 
erroneous.'" State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46, \ 4, 94 P.3d 268 (quoting State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995)). 
3. Did the trial court correctly interpret the plea-in-abeyance agreement to require 
defendant to pay restitution of $22,880 every six months? 
2 
Standard of Review: "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, 
determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, [this court will] 
accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness 
standard. However, if the contract is ... ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to find 
facts respecting the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then [this 
court's] review is strictly limited." Peterson v. Sun Rider Corp., 2002 UT 43, % 14,48 
P.3d 918 (citing Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case involves the interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-2a-2(5) (West 
2004) which states: "A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 
months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea 
was to any degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and felonies." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 22 May 2001 the State charged defendant with: 
a) thirteen counts of securities fraud, seven of which were second degree 
felonies and six of which where third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000); 
b) thirteen counts of selling unregistered securities, all third degree felonies 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (2000); 
c) four counts of employment of an unlicensed agent, all third degree 
felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3 (2000); and 
d) one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree 
felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1999). 
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R. 1-12. 
On 26 November 2002, defendant entered no contest pleas to all thirty-one counts 
and the trial court agreed to hold the pleas in abeyance on certain conditions. R. 344-66; 
a copy of the plea-in-abeyance agreement is attached as Addendum A. On 28 May 2003 
the State filed a motion for an order to show cause alleging that defendant had violated 
the terms of the plea-in-abeyance agreement. R. 399. On 29 January 2004 the trial court 
held a hearing and found that defendant had violated the agreement. R. 557-60; 705: 1, 
57-58; a copy of the transcript from the order to show cause hearing is attached as 
Addendum B. 
On 27 April 2004 the trial court entered defendant's no contest pleas to all thirty-
one counts and sentenced defendant to serve one-to-fifteen years on each of the eight 
second degree felony counts and zero-to-five years on each of the twenty-three third 
degree felony counts. R. 674-76; 706: 17. The trial court ran all of the terms 
concurrently. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 678. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crimes 
In the summer of 2000, defendant arrived in Vernal, Utah with an offer that was 
too good to be true. R. 16-20. Through a company known as High Desert Financial, 
defendant and his agents began selling one month promissory notes with interest rates of 
10% to 20%, translating to annual rates of 120% to 240%. R. 18. Petitioner collected 
more than $269,000 from investors. R. 17. 
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The promissory notes were unregistered securities and neither defendant nor his 
agents were licensed to sell them. R. 17. More importantly, defendant failed to disclose 
to his investors that (1) High Desert Financial had filed for bankruptcy in 1998; (2) 
defendant had previously filed two personal bankruptcies; (3) defendant had been 
arrested at least twice for passing bad checks; and (4) he had been assessed more than 
$100,000 in various federal and state tax liens. R. 17-19. 
Trial Delays 
The trial court originally set defendant's trial for April of 2002. R. 89. Defendant, 
however, changed his retained counsel three times before trial, necessitating three 
continuances of the original trial date. R. 32, 124, 133-34,140, 172, 248,253, 262-63. 
The Plea-In-Abeyance Agreement 
Finally, on 26 November 2002, defendant entered no contest pleas to all thirty-one 
counts. R. 344-66 (Add. A). The trial court agreed to hold the pleas in abeyance for six 
years. R. 351 (Add. A). In exchange, defendant agreed, among other things, to violate 
no law and pay total restitution of $274,550. R. 350-51 (Add. A). 
Defendant agreed to pay restitution on the following schedule: 
Defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of 
$22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have 
not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to 
determine if he has substantially complied with the restitution payments. 
R. 350 (Add A). 
The agreement also stated that "[defendant shall make full payment of restitution 
on or before November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of restitution on or 
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before Nobember 26,2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result in the entry on 
the record of all pleas." R. 349-50 (Add. A). 
If defendant paid full restitution by December 2008, and kept all other terms of the 
agreement, then all charges would be dismissed with the exception of four counts of sale 
of unregistered securities, third degree felonies. R. 347-48 (Add. A). The State would 
then argue for probation. Id. 
Defendant would get an even better deal if he paid full restitution within one year. 
R. 348-49 (Add. A). If defendant paid full restitution by December 2003, and kept all 
other terms of the agreement, then all charges would be dismissed with the exception of 
one count of sale of unregistered securities, a third degree felony. R. 349 (Add. A). The 
State would then argue for a term of probation not to exceed one year and would not 
object to a motion to reduce the degree of offense, provided defendant successfully 
completed probation. Id. 
The Order to Show Cause Hearing 
On 29 January 2004, the trial court held an order to show cause hearing based on 
the State's allegations that defendant had violated the agreement by 1) failing to timely 
pay restitution; 2) engaging in unlawful mortgage brokerage services in Nevada; 3) 
passing a check without sufficient funds in Nevada; and 4) committing theft by false 
pretenses in Nevada. R. 544-45, 557-60; 705: 1 (Add. B). 
At the order to show cause hearing, Michael Hines, director of the enforcement for 
the Utah Division of Securities, testified that he had conducted the investigation that led 
to defendant's charges in this case and had participated in the plea negotiations with 
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defendant. R. 705: 16-17 (Add. B). Mr. Hines testified that the parties carefully 
negotiated the terms for repaying restitution, including the scheduled six month 
payments. R. 705: 19-20 (Add. B). He explained that defendant's counsel "made it very 
clear that if we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic, we would be setting 
[defendant] up to fail." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). He also testified that the State made it very 
clear during the plea discussions that the six month "deadlines would have to be met." R. 
705: 20 (Add. B). 
The plea-in-abeyance agreement was entered 26 November 2002. R. 366 (Add. 
A). Defendant paid $10,000 in restitution on 28 May 2003 and $12,880 on 8 July 2003. 
R. 705: 21 (Add. B). 
After defendant agreed to the terms of the plea-in-abeyance agreement, Nevada 
authorities charged him with passing a check with insufficient funds and a Nevada court 
issued a warrant for defendant's failure to appear on that charge. R. 705: 22-24 (Add. B). 
Defendant was also bound over in Nevada district court on four charges of theft by false 
pretenses. R. 705: 26-29 (Add. B). The Financial Institutions Division of the Nevada 
Department of Business and Industry also ordered defendant to cease and desist his 
unlicensed loan activity in Nevada. R. 705: 24-25 (Add. B). 
Defendant's Evidence 
Defendant testified that he pled not guilty to the bad check charge and that his 
failure to appear was simply a misunderstanding. R. 705: 37-40 (Add. B). He explained 
that he posted a $500.00 cash bond based on the warrant for his failure to appear. R. 705: 
38-39 (Add. B). He also admitted that despite his not guilty plea, his Nevada attorney 
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"paid a $101 fin[e] out of his own trust account, and the Court refunded my $500 bail," 
and closed the case. R. 705: 39-40 (Add. B). Defendant also admitted that Nevada 
authorities had served him with a cease and desist order. R. 705: 42 (Add. B). He 
claimed, however, that the order was issued in error and that he was properly licensed to 
make loans in Nevada. R. 705: 41-42 (Add. B). 
With respect to the restitution repayment schedule, defendant testified that he 
believed the six month payment schedule was "only a watermark, as it were," and that the 
six month intervals were not strict deadlines. R. 705: 36 (Add. B). Defendant disputed 
that the parties had extensively negotiated the payment schedule. R. 705: 35 (Add. B). 
Rather, he claimed that his attorney simply "dropped the agreement on [him]" when he 
arrived at court on 26 November 2002. R. 705: 35 (Add. B). 
Defendant nevertheless admitted that he had participated in negotiating the terms 
of the agreement. R. 705: 37, 50-53 (Add. B). He claimed that the State had originally 
set the agreement for six years and that he "was the one that sweetened it, so to speak." 
R. 705: 37 (Add. B). Defendant explained that during the negotiations he proposed that 
"all this go away and [b]e reduced down to a Class A," provided he "could make these 
alleged victims whole within the first year, at the end of 2003." Id. 
Defendant's "sweetened" deal was included as part of the typewritten agreement 
that he initialed and signed, and that the trial court executed on 26 November 2002. R. 
344-66 (Add. A); 705: 50-53 (Add. B). 
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The Trial Court's Ruling 
The trial court found that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance agreement by 1) 
failing to make his first restitution payment timely, and 2) violating the law. R. 705: 57-
58 (Add. B). The trial court found that defendant did not make the required restitution 
payment of $22,880 on the due date. Id. at 58. It also found that defendant violated the 
law because he "wrote a bad check and [has] apparently satisfied that in the Sparks, 
Nevada Justice Court." Id. The trial court did not consider defendant's bind-over on the 
four theft by false pretenses charges because defendant had not yet been convicted on 
those charges. Id. at 57. Nevertheless, the trial court noted that defendant's pattern of 
conduct was concerning. Id. at 57-58. 
The trial court also found that defendant admitted that Nevada authorities had 
served him with a cease and desist order. R. 705: 57 (Add. B). The trial court noted that 
the "[cease and desist] order demonstrates a pattern of conduct with concerns the Court, 
because that's what happened here in Utah in the present case." Id. 
Regarding the length of the abeyance term, the trial court found that the six-year 
term was designed to provide defendant sufficient time to repay his substantial restitution 
and therefore defendant was not prejudiced by any error in the length of the agreement. 
R. 705: 12 (Add. B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant claims that his plea is invalid because the six-year abeyance term 
violates section 77-2a-2(5), which limits an abeyance term for felonies to three years. 
However, defendant invited any error in the six-year abeyance term because he 
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negotiated for that amount of time to enable him to pay $274,550 in restitution. 
Moreover, any error was harmless because defendant violated the agreement after only 
six months and the six-year term was established for his benefit. 
II. The trial court correctly found that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance 
agreement by passing a bad check in Nevada. Although defendant claims that the 
evidence was insufficient to support this finding, he ignores the only evidence on which 
the trial court relied: his admission that he had paid a fine to satisfy the bad check 
charge. 
III. The trial court correctly interpreted the abeyance agreement to require 
defendant to pay restitution of $22,880 every six months. The language of the agreement 
is unambiguous. But even if ambiguous, the evidence demonstrated that the parties 
intended to establish a firm schedule for restitution payments. The trial court also 
correctly found that defendant's first payment, which was not paid in full until nearly two 
months after the due date, did not substantially comply with the agreement's 
requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR BASED ON THE 
CREATION OF A SIX-YEAR ABEYANCE TERM; 
ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant argues that the plea-in-abeyance agreement is invalid because it created 
a six-year abeyance term, contrary to section 77-2a-2(5). Br. Aplt. at 10-13. That section 
states: "[a] plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than ... three years if 
the plea was to any degree of felony." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-2(5) (West 2004). 
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Defendant argues that this Court should declare a misplea and remand the case for trial. 
Br. Aplt. at 13. This Court should not allow defendant to benefit from an error he invited. 
"The invited error doctrine provides that 'on appeal, a party cannot take advantage 
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error.'" State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, \ 14, 95 P.3d 1216 (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant invited any error in the length of the abeyance period. He specifically 
negotiated for the six-year abeyance term to give him sufficient time to pay the 
substantial restitution he owed. Michael Hines testified that the restitution payment 
schedule was carefully negotiated and that defendant's attorney "made it very clear 
[during plea negotiations] that if we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic, 
we would be setting [defendant] up to fail." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). Defendant also 
specifically agreed to the six-year period as evidenced by his initials on the plea 
agreement. R. 351 (Add. A). Moreover, in his third claim on appeal, defendant relies on 
the agreement's six-year deadline to support his claim that the trial court misinterpreted 
the agreement to create strict six-month deadlines for restitution payments. Br. Aplt. at 
17-21. Consequently, defendant invited any error in the six-year term and cannot benefit 
therefrom. See Montiel, 200 UT App 242 at \ 14. 
Alternatively, any error was harmless. As discussed above, defendant negotiated 
the six-year abeyance period to give him sufficient time to repay the substantial 
restitution he owed. Moreover, defendant violated the agreement after only six months, 
well within even the statutory three-year limit. The statutory three-year limit will not 
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even expire until 26 November 2005. Defendant could not be harmed by any error in the 
length of the agreement unless the State sought to enforce the plea agreement beyond the 
statutory three-year limit. Because any error arising from the six-year abeyance period 
was harmless, defendant's first issue fails. 
Should the Court nevertheless find reversible error, defendant is correct that a 
misplea should be declared and the matter remanded for trial. See State v. Moss, 921 
P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the trial court's declaration of a misplea 
and scheduling of a preliminary hearing where defendant's plea-in-abeyance to attempted 
sexual abuse of a child violated section 77-2a-3(7), which expressly prohibits abeyance 
agreements to sexual crimes against children). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED THE PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE 
AGREEMENT BY WRITING A BAD CHECK 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously found that he violated the plea-in-
abeyance agreement by writing a bad check because the State relied on inadmissible 
hearsay to establish the crime, and, in any event, the State's evidence was insufficient. 
Br. Aplt. at 13-16. Defendant argues that the only evidence the State produced to prove 
he passed a bad check was hearsay testimony from Michael Hines that Nevada authorities 
told him they had charged defendant with passing a bad check, and a certified copy of a 
Nevada court docket showing that defendant had been charged with, but not convicted of, 
passing a bad check and that he had failed to appear on the charge. Id. However, 
defendant ignores his admission that his attorney paid a fine to satisfy the bad check 
charge. 
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Defendant testified that he "believed [his Nevada attorney] entered [his] plea of 
not guilty" to the bad check charge. R. 705: 39 (Add. B). Despite claiming that he had 
pled not guilty, however, defendant admitted that his Nevada attorney "paid a $101 fm[e] 
out of his own trust account, and the Court refunded my $500 bail. They sent it back to 
me and that case was closed, as far as I know, because the Court sent my bail back to 
me." Id. at 39-40. 
Based on this testimony, the trial court correctly found that defendant had 
committed the crime of passing a bad check and had satisfied his punishment for that 
crime by paying a fine. Defendant failed to explain why, having pled not guilty, he paid 
a fine and the case was closed. A not guilty plea would have presumably led to a trial. 
Instead, defendant paid a fine and his bail was refunded. R. 705: 39-40 (Add. B). 
Consequently, the trial court correctly found that defendant "did violate a law. He wrote 
a bad check and [h]as apparently satisfied that in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court." R. 
705: 58 (Add. B). This finding alone was sufficient to find defendant in violation of the 
plea-in-abeyance agreement. And this finding—based on defendant's admission—was 
supported by more than sufficient evidence. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
DEFENDANT'S LATE RESTITUTION PAYMENT VIOLATED 
THE PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE AGREEMENT 
Defendant does not dispute that his first restitution payment was late. Br. Aplt. at 
17-21. Indeed, at the order to show cause hearing, defendant's counsel admitted that 
"[defendant] did pay what would be the $22,880, which was the first payment, but the 
same was late." R. 705: 55 (Add. B). 
13 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the trial court erroneously interpreted the 
plea agreement to find that the late payment violated the agreement. Br. Aplt. at 17-21. 
Under defendant's interpretation of the agreement, the only strict deadline is 26 
November 2008, the date on which he was to have paid full restitution. Id. at 18. 
Defendant contends that the agreement's "substantial compliance" language allows that 
"the individual six month payments did not need to be paid in full or on exact dates as 
long as [defendant] was making substantial payments toward the full restitution or a 
substantial payment toward $22,880.00 for that six month period." Id. at 19. He 
contends that if the agreement establishes strict six-month deadlines, then the "substantial 
compliance" language is meaningless. Id. at 20. Defendant misunderstands the 
agreement. 
The relevant language of the agreement provides that defendant "shall pay 
restitution" of $274,550.00. R. 350 (Add. A). The agreement then states that 
"[defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of $22,880 each six 
months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will 
appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially complied with the 
restitution payments." Id. The agreement also provides that "[defendant shall make full 
payment of restitution on or before November 26,2008." Id. 
"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts and have applied principles derived 
from contract law to plea agreements." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (additional citations omitted). "[Cjontract principles 'cannot be blindly 
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incorporated into the criminal law in the area of plea bargaining.'" Id. (quoting United 
States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980)). Nevertheless, contract principles 
provide relevant guidance for interpreting plea agreements. See United States v. 
Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We will apply accepted principles of 
contract law to determine whether one party or the other has violated a plea agreement"). 
When interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. See 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc's., 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599. 
This Court will "'first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intentions of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 113 
P.2d 1382,1385 (Utah 1989)). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.'" Id. 
(quoting Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, If 14, 987 P.2d 48). In evaluating 
whether the plain language is ambiguous, [this Court will] attempt to harmonize all of the 
contract's provisions and all of its terms." Id. Additionally, "all of its terms should be 
given effect if it is possible to do so." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc's., 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). "'An ambiguity exists where the language is reasonably capable 
of being understood in more than one sense.'" Central Florida Investments, Inc., 2002 
UT 3, at If 12, (quoting Dixon, 1999 UT 89, at \ 14) (additional quotations omitted). 
The trial court correctly interpreted the plea agreement to require defendant to pay 
$22,880 every six months. The agreement unambiguously requires that "[defendant 
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shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of $22,880 each six months." R. 
350 (Add A). 
Contrary to defendant's interpretation, the "substantial compliance" clause does 
not render the agreement ambiguous or excuse defendant from making the individual 
payments "in full or on exact dates." Br. Aplt. at 19. Nor does interpreting the 
agreement to establish strict six-month deadlines render the "substantial compliance" 
clause meaningless. Br. Aplt. at 20. 
The agreement unambiguously requires defendant to pay "$22,880.00 each six 
months." R. 350 (Add. A). The "substantial compliance" clause merely establishes what 
is to happen if defendant does not fulfill his obligation under the agreement. If defendant 
does not make the required payment timely, then the "substantial compliance" clause 
provides that defendant will not be in violation if he has "substantially complied with the 
restitution payments." Id. 
This interpretation of the agreement harmonizes and gives effect to all its terms. 
See Central Florida Investments\ 2002 UT 3, at \ 12; Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 
895. In contrast, defendant's interpretation ignores the mandatory language of the 
agreement that "[defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of 
$22,880.00 each six months." R. 350 (Add. A). 
Defendant contends that the State's own testimony demonstrates that the 
agreement did not establish strict deadlines or amounts. Br. Aplt. at 19-20. But 
defendant misreads the transcript of the order to show cause hearing. First, the 
prosecutor, in questioning Michael Hines, asked "was it also ordered then that 
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[defendant] was to make regular payments specifically approximately $22,000 each six 
months?" R. 705: 19 (Add. B). Defendant highlights the prosecutor's use of the word 
"approximately." Br. Aplt. at 19. The prosecutor, however, was not "testifying" that the 
agreement required only approximate payments. Rather, the prosecutor used the word 
"approximately" because he was not quoting the exact figure from the agreement. 
Defendant next cites the prosecutor's question to Mr. Hines that "the first six-
month period would roughly be around the May 26th date," emphasizing the word 
"roughly." Br. Aplt. at 20 (quoting R. 705:20 (Add. B)). Again, the prosecutor was not 
"testifying" that the agreement established only "rough" deadlines. Rather, he used the 
word "roughly" to indicate that he was merely estimating the due date as May 26th 
because he had not calculated exactly six months from the entry of the agreement. 
In any event, the language of the agreement, not the text of the prosecutor's 
questions, establishes defendant's responsibilities under the agreement. As discussed 
above, the language of the agreement unambiguously required defendant to pay "$22,880 
each six months." R. 350 (Add. A). 
"Contract terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to 
endow them with a different meaning than that relied upon by the drafter." Buehner 
Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895. Unlike defendant's interpretation of the agreement, the trial 
court's interpretation harmonizes and gives effect to all of the agreement's terms. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly held that defendant's admittedly late payment was a 
violation of the agreement. 
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Even if defendant were correct that the agreement was ambiguous, the evidence at 
the order-to-show-cause hearing demonstrated that the parties intended to establish strict 
six-month deadlines. Mr. Hines affirmed that the restitution payment schedule was 
"carefully negotiated and carefully explained." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). He testified that the 
State's intent "was in getting back some money to the investors who had lost this amount 
of money. So we made it very clear in those discussions that those deadlines would have 
to be met." R. 705: 20 (Add. B). The trial court had discretion to discount defendant's 
testimony to the contrary. See State v. Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, \ 15, 51 P.3d 55 ("the 
court has considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This 
discretion includes the right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence") (quoting 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Therefore, even if the 
language of the agreement were ambiguous, triatrial court correctly held that the 
agreement established strict six-month deadlines for each restitution payment. 
The trial court also properly found that defendant had not substantially complied 
with the agreement. The trial court executed the plea-in-abeyance agreement on 26 
November 2002. R. 344, 366 (Add. A). Defendant's first restitution payment of $22,880 
was therefore due on 26 May 2003. Defendant's first payment totaled only $10,000— 
less than half of what he owed—and was made on 28 May 2003. R. 21. While defendant 
did pay $12,880 on 8 July 2003, that second partial payment was nearly two months late. 
This was not substantial compliance with the abeyance agreement. 
Additionally, evidence indicated that defendant may have used illegally obtained 
funds to pay his restitution. Defendant admitted that the Financial Institutions Division 
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of the Nevada Department of Business and Industry had ordered him to cease and desist 
his mortgage loan activity in Nevada. R. 705: 24-25,42 (Add. B). Nevada has also 
bound defendant over on four counts of theft by false pretenses. R. 26-28. The trial court 
was properly concerned about defendant's pattern of conduct. R. 705: 57-58 (Add. B). 
Therefore, it correctly found that defendant had not substantially complied with the 
restitution payment schedule. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's order finding 
that defendant violated his plea-in-abeyance agreement and entering defendant's no 
contest pleas. 
Respectfully submitted jj November 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
G. Mark Thomas, #6664 
Deputy Uintah County At to rney 
152 Eas t 100 North 
Vernal , UT 84078 
Telephone: (435) 781-5438 
Fax: (435) 781-5428 2 6 2892 
DEPUTY IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH 
DOB: 07/09/1955 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN 
ADVANCE OF GUILTY- PLEA 
AND AGREEMENT 
Case No. 011800166 
Judge John R. Anderson 
I, Michael Richard Schubarth, hereby acknowledge and certify 
that I have been advised of and that I understand the following 
facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading ajiadrty to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory-
Provision 
1. Securities Fraud 
2 . Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
4. Securities Fraud 
5. Securities Fraud 
Degree Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory-
Third Degree Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
Felony 0 to 5 Years USP 
Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
Felony 1 to 15 Years USP 
Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
Felony 1 to 15 Years USP 
Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
Felony 1 to 15 Years USP 
Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
Felony 1 to 15 Years USP 
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Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Degree 
Second Degree 
Felony-
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony-
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony-
Second Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max, $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
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Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
23. Sale of Unregistered 
24. Sale of Unregistered 
25. Sale of Unregistered 
26. Sale of Unregistered 
27. Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
28. Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
29. Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
30. Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
31. Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity 
Degree 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP" 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
I have received a copy of the Information against me. I 
have read it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and 
the_ elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guil-fey. 
The elements of the crime (s) to which I am pleading 
guilty are: 
COUNT 1 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about July 7, 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did willfully, 
in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security to 
James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed any device scheme 
or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading; and/or engaged in any 
act, practice, or "course of business which operated or would 
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the amount was 
$10,000. 
COUNT 2 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 11, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 3 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about October 2000, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Dusty (Johnson) Grothusen, directly or indirectly; 
employed any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; 
and/or engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and 
the amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 4 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 16, 2001, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Brian Jensen, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 5 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 12, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Michael Nielson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 6 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 29, 2001, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Brian Skinner, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and\- the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 7 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about November 16, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was $10,000. 
COUNT 8 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about December 18, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
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COUNT 9 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about November 29, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to 01in Draney, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 10 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 21, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 11 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about November 10, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party.to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 12 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 6, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
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necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 13 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 15, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in .that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice-, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 14 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about July 7, 2000'^  in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James 
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 15 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 11, 2 0 00, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James 
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 16 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about October 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Dusty 
(Johnson) Grothusen, in Utah which was not registered with the 
Division, nor was the investment a federally covered security for 
which a notice filing had been made with the Division, nor did the 
security qualify for an exemption from registration. 
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COUNT 17 SALE OP UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 16, 2001, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian 
Jensen, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 18 SALE OP UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 12, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Michael 
Nielson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 19 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felonyu., in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 29, 2001, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian 
Skinner, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 20 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 16, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott 
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 21 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 18, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott 
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
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COUNT 22 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 29, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Olin 
Draney, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 23 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 21, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie 
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 24 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony;, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 10, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie 
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 25 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 6, 20 00, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene 
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 26 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 15, 20 00, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene 
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
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COUNT 27 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about September 
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, 
did willfully employ or engage Amy J. Garcia, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 28 EMPLOYMENT OP UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about December 
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, 
did willfully employ or engage James E. Burns, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 29 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000, 
through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did 
willfully employ or engage Lloyd V. Wales, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 30 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000, 
through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did 
willfully employ or engage Nathan S. Hardman, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, from on or about June 16, 2000 
through January 29, 2001 in violation of §76-10-1603, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD 
SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, received proceeds derived, 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity as more 
fully defined in Counts 1 through 30 above, in which they 
participated as a principal, or they used or invested, directly or 
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, 
or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of those 
proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise; through a pattern of unlawful 
activity acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, any 
interest in or control of any enterprise; or were employed by, or 
associated with any enterprise and conducted or participated, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's 
affairs through,a pattern of unlawful activity. The unlawful 
activity included three or more violations of securities fraud. 
$4-7 
I understand that by pleading gtrirfEy I will be remitting « rJTC
4^ iat- T ^aryrmrn 1-t-pd the crimes listed above. I stipulate and agree 
that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts 
provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove 
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
Count(s) 1 - 1 3 SECURITIES FRAUD 
Count(S) 1 3 - 2 6 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY 
Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT 
Count 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that 
I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and the 
United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will 
give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented & 
by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (h^ fe) waived my right to counsel. I certify 9-
that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and 
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. 
I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
3S? 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Blake Nakamura. My attorney and I have fully discussed this 
statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
J\iry Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and < & 
public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be 
giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know 
that if I were to have a trial I would have the right to see and 
observe the witnesses in open court who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses-, who 
testified against me in open court. 
\0 Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to and I would be able 
to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to 
appear, the State would pay those costs. 
U^ J Right to testify and privilege against self-
incrimination. I know that if I were to have a trial, I would have 
the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give 
evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me and if it were a non-jury trial, the judge would not hold my 
refusal against me. 
36* 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know 
that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed innocent until the 
State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s) . If I choose 
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would 
have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
\JQ I understand that if ^ I^plead guilty, I give up the 
presumption of innocence and wirL\be admittMig frfrat T commifrtod the 
crime(s) stated above. 
X Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I 
were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal 
my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that 
I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. 
«K\ I know and understand that by pleading guilty/ I am 
waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional rights 
as explained above. _ 
Consequences of Entering a Qa±TE\E P3rea~ 
Potential penalties. I know the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am pleading 
guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a 
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
36/ 
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include 
a jail/prison term, fine, or both. 
1^ I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent 
(85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered 
to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement. 
(\y Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if 
there is more than one crime involved, the sentences may be imposed 
one after another (consecutively) , or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional- fine 
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on 
probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty 
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on 
me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when 
I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to 
impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on 
the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or 
sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or suspended 
sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made 
or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not 
binding on the judge. 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No 
force, threats, of unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an 
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in 
it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
Contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 4 f years of age- I have attended school through the 
f2/M grade. I can read and understand the English language. If 
I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to 
me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be 
mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, 
or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am 
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my 
plea. . 
I understand that if I want to withdraw myigasx%fev plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days 
after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered. 
I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. 
I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Plea bargain. My plea is a result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties 
and provisions of this plea agreement, if any, are fully contained 
in this agreement and are as follows: 
1. I hereby enter my plea of guilty to the charges of: 
Count(s) 1 - 1 3 SECURITIES FRAUD 
Count(s) 1 3 - 2 6 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY 
Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT 
Count 31 PATTERN OE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
A) C#£M~~ 
2. Upon acceptance of the -gtrrity plea, the State does 
hereby recommend that the Court place the plea in abeyance and not 
cause it to be entered upon the records for a period of SIX (6) 
YEARS on the following terms: 
a. Defendant hereby agrees to make himself 
available to report to the Court whenever requested to do so and 
further agrees to keep' both his attorney and the Uintah County 
Attorney apprised as to his current mailing address at all times. 
b. Defendant hereby agrees to violate no laws of 
the United States, the State of Utah, or any municipality during 
the term of this agreement. In the event that Defendant is 
arrested, cited, or otherwise charged with any violation, Defendant 
3S> 
& 
^ 
@ 
shall notify the County Attorney's office within 72 hours of said 
violation. 
vSn c. Defendant shall pay restitution to named victims 
as listed in the information and victims listed herein which are 
not listed in the information as follows: 
James Burns $50,000.00 
Dusty Grothusen $11,000.00 
Brian Jensen $14,000.00 
Michael Nielson $15,000.00 
Brian Skinner $35,000.00 
Scott Sorenson $12,500.00 
Olin Draney $9,100.00 
Julie Peirce $7,500.00 
Arlene Thompson $59,000.00 
Darlene Burns $20,000.00 
Mark Caldwell $5,000.00 
Lisa Glick $10,000.00 
Floyd Morton $5,000.00 
Linette Rollins $10,000.00 
Dale Kidd $10,000.00 
Carol Dixon $1,450.00 
TOTAL $274,550.00 
d. Defendant shall make payments toward restitution 
in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the 
amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear 
in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially 
complied with the restitution payments. / The sole is^sHite for review 
is whether there has been substantial compliaa^e with the payment 
agreement. The defendant expressly waives any/bright he may have 
for the court to hear arguments concerning hts ability to pay. \ 
e. Defendant shall make full payment of restitution 
^ 
on or before November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of 
'to 
restitution on or before November 26, 2008 is a violation of this 
agreement and shall result in the entry on the record of all pleas. 
V~% Full payment of restitution is an absolute term of this 
agreement. Failure by defendant to pay full restitution for any 
reason shall result in a violation of this agreement and result in 
the entry of all pleas on the record. 
\o That this matter come before the court for review on the 
second law and motion day in Nj^ rernber 2003, at 10:00 a.m. or at 
such other time as the Court may hereinafter set. If at that time 
the Court finds that all the restitution has been paid and there 
have been no other violations of the plea agreement, the defendant 
will be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charges of 
(1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, 
(27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF 
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the court may then entertain a motion from 
the Defendant to dismiss these charges. The State will concur in 
such motion if there have been no violations of the agreement, the 
restitution has been paid and there are no violations pending. 
Count 26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES will then enter 
against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced on 
said charge. The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison 
time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this 
matter. The State will argue for a term of probation not to exceed 
1 year. The State will not object to a Motion by the defendant to 
reduce the charge to the next lower category only in the following 
circumstances: 
& 
l/& 
a. Defendant is placed on probation; 
b. Defendant is subsequently discharged from probation 
without violating any terms of his probation; 
c. Defendant violates no laws during the term of his 
probation an up until his motion to reduce the category 
of the offense; and 
d. Defendant successfully completes the term of his 
probation. 
\J If the defendant does not have all the restitution paid 
on or beforej&oyember- 26, 2003, but does have the restitution paid 
on or before November 26, 2008, then this matter will come before 
the court for review on the second law and motion day in November 
2008, at 10:00 a.m. or at such other time as the Court may 
hereinafter set. If at that time the Court finds that all the 
restitution has been paid and there have been no other violations 
of the plea agreement, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw 
his plea of guilty to the charges of (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-
26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF 
UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the 
court may then entertain a motion from the Defendant to dismiss 
these charges. The State will concur in such motion if there have 
been no violations of the agreement, the restitution has been paid 
and there are no violations pending. 
Counts 23-26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, will then 
enter against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced 
on said charges. The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison 
® 
time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this 
matter. The State will argue for probation. 
\\/) If, at any time during the term hereof, it comes to 
the attention of the Uintah County Attorney that Defendant has 
failed to comply with any of the terms of this agreement, the 
County Attorney may then go to the Court and request, by 
appropriate motion and affidavit, an Order to Show Cause requiring 
Defendant to appear and show cause why judgement for (1-13) 
SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, (27-30) 
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL 
ACTIVITY should not be imposed and Defendant sentenced accordingly. 
Service of said Order to Show Cause may be had upon defense counsel 
and Defendant does hereby waive personal service upon him of any 
such order. If, after, a hearing, the Court makes a finding that 
there is evidence that Defendant has failed to strictly comply with 
all terms of this agreement it shall immediately order imposition 
of the (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN 
OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY judgement and Defendant shall be sentenced 
accordingly. 
Dated this 26th day of November, 2002.,/I if 
MICHAEL RI 
DEFENDANT 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for MICHAEL RICHARD 
SCHUBARTH, the defendant above, and that I know he has read the 
statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with 
him and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, .are accurate and true. 
BLA^>AKAMURA 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
21 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) 
is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached 
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support 
the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) 
are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
G. MARK THOMAS 
PROSECUTION ATTORNI 
22 
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Order 
The Court, having heard the representations made to it by 
counsel, having determined that Defendant is fully aware of his 
constitutional rights and of the purpose of this proceeding, 
accepts Defendant's pleas of guilty and finds that it is knowingly 
made and that he is under no undue stress or influence. The Court 
further approves the terms of the agreement set forth hereinabove 
and orders that Defendant's plea of guilty be placed in abeyance 
and that judgment not be entered against Defendant at this time but 
rather that imposition of judgment be stayed pursuant to the terms 
of the above set forth agreement until the Law and 
Motion Calendar in or until such other time as the 
Court may order. Until such time as judgment is formally entered 
herein against Defendant, or charges are dismissed against 
Defendant, Defendant is ordered to comply with all terms of the 
above set forth agreement and failure to do so shall be dealt with 
accordingly to the terms thereof. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 2( 
JDERSON 
)istrict Court Judge 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 29, 2004) 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. 
4 MR. THOMAS: Good morning, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah versus Michael 
6 Richard Schubarth. The defendant is present. Mr. Beaslin is 
7 here. Mr. Thomas is here representing the State. This was the 
8 date and time set for evidentiary hearing on the question of 
9 whether the plea in abeyance should be revoked for substantial 
10 noncompliance. 
11 I guess as a matter of housekeeping there are some 
12 issues that the Court should address or at least raise. I 
13 received from Mr. Schubarth a motion to terminate Mr. Beaslin, 
14 it was dated July 6 — or January 16th. I received that January 
15 21st. Now, Mr. Schubarth, is that still an issue? 
16 MR. SCHUBARTH: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, indigent defendants have a 
18 Constitutional Right to Court appointed Counsel. They do not 
19 have the right to substitute Counsel or complain about Counsel 
20 unless there is good reason. 
21 I suppose I need to inquire of you, Mr. Schubarth, as 
22 to some specific grounds of dissatisfaction. Let me advise you 
23 that because Mr. Beaslin does not have a substantial securities 
24 practice or is not a so-called expert in securities law isn't 
25 going to apply because there is no one that we could appoint 
-4-
1 that would meet that qualification. This is a criminal case at 
2 this point. 
3 You also indicated that Counsel has not followed 
4 through with specific requests. Well, your lawyer is not 
5 going to jump through hoops for you unless there is some — 
6 the lawyer has control of what should be done. You indicate 
7 he hasn't met with you in a timely manner, and he's not duly 
8 informed. 
9 I want to tell you — I want to ask you about that, 
10 and then I want to ask you about this conflict of interest that 
11 you've alleged. Mr. Beaslin is an ethical and a good lawyer. 
12 He is not going to continue in a case where he perceives a 
13 conflict of interest, but I'd like you to tell me — or 
14 elaborate on that. 
15 MR. SCHUBARTH: The conflict of interest part first? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, uh-huh. 
17 MR. SCHUBARTH: My understanding that one of my co-
18 defendants, Nathan Hardman, Mr. Beaslin's represented him in 
19 the most recent past. That there might be a conflict there. I 
20 understand that he was a partner with you at some point in time 
21 in the past. I don't know if that is grounds for a conflict or 
22 not. 
23 I asked him prior — when we had first met, if he 
24 would do a conflicts check the first week in January of all 
25 the people involved, all of the alleged victims, all the 
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1 codefendants, and that didn't happen, and it came up in 
2 conversation as early as last Saturday, which confirms some 
3 of the concerns I had that he has represented some of the 
4 codefendants in this thing. I have a concern about that. 
5 I don't know how deep your relationship was between 
6 you and Mr. Beaslin, but there is a potential concern for me 
7 about that, too. I am not questioning his ethics. I'm not 
8 questioning his abilities. I think this is a very, very, 
9 very complex case. I think his time is limited. I think he 
10 would agree with me on that. He doesn't have the time or the 
11 wherewithal to go through this, but there is people that he has 
12 represented that are involved in this case. 
13 THE COURT: Well, let me indicate to you that this is 
14 a small community and Mr. Beaslin may very well have defended 
15 or represented some of the codefendants or the victims, but 
16 certainly not connected with this case. Mr. Beaslin, do you — 
17 have you discussed that with Mr. Schubarth? Do you perceive 
18 any conflicts? 
19 MR. BEASLIN: I didn't see any, your Honor. I thought 
20 about it when I saw that Mr. Hardman had been subpoenaed by" 
21 Mr. Thomas, but that case involves a burglary and a theft and 
22 has nothing to do with this other — this case. 
23 THE COURT: Are you still actively representing him? 
24 MR. BEASLIN: Yeah, I am, your Honor. I believe that 
25 Mr. Thomas and I settled that last week, and he's going to 
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1 enter a plea on those charges in about a week in Judge Payne's 
2 Court, but it has nothing to do with this matter. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Beaslin, do you feel that your 
4 communications with Mr. Schubarth as his lawyer has affected 
5 your ability to professionally represent him? 
6 MR. BEASLIN: Probably not. I think the ultimate issue 
7 here — I've gone through everything. In fact, I was advised 
8 early this morning. I've got everything here that you have, 
9 and it's just going to be a question of whether or not, as 
10 suggested, that they're merely saying that there's not been the 
11 payments. The allegations remain here. 
12 I've talked to his attorneys, both Blake Nakamura and 
13 also to John (inaudible). I talked to him late last night, 
14 and he represents him in the Nevada cases as to the counts out 
15 there. So I don't feel there's a conflict. If — unless he 
16 feels strongly about it, then you can have somebody else. 
17 THE COURT: Well, again, the relative cases are such 
18 that the indigent defendant is not in a position to pick and 
19 choose, unless I find there's some good reason for substitute 
20 Counsel. I have been on the bench for 11 years. Before that I 
21 was a partner with Mr. Beaslin, but our relationship was always 
22 good. That would probably be to your advantage. If anyone's 
23 got a complaint about that, it's probably Mr. Thomas, but 
24 that's been 10 years ago. I don't even make that announcement 
25 anymore. I will tell you now that I would not have any 
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1 prejudice or bias one way or the other against Mr. Beaslin. 
2 I'm going to find at this point, Mr. Schubarth, 
3 that Mr. Beaslin — that there isn't really good ground to 
4 substitute lawyer. I'd like to have a securities lawyer come 
5 in here and represent you, but unfortunately one wouldn't do 
6 it for what the indigent defense Counsel are paid. So you're 
7 stuck. 
8 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, may I also for the record 
9 state that State's response to his motions. Have you seen my 
10 written responses? 
11 THE COURT: I have not. 
12 MR. THOMAS: I've provided a written response. 
13 THE COURT: I'm particularly interested in your written 
14 responses or what you have to say about the later set of 
15 motions. 
16 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, I don't have a written response on 
17 that set of motions. I didn't have time to prepare a written 
18 response, but I do have responses — 
19 THE COURT: What I — 
20 MR. THOMAS: — as to the issue of an attorney, though, 
21 I would address that. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, make a record. 
23 MR. THOMAS: Yeah. Just for purposes of the record 
24 I think it should be clear, one of the allegations that the 
25 defendant claimed was a conflict with potential witnesses, but 
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1 I think that the Court needs to remain in the context of this 
2 particular hearing. We're not here to decide the underlying 
3 facts of the case, unless a securities attorney is not either 
4 necessary, nor advisable. 
5 The only issue here is whether or not there was 
6 compliance with the terms of a plea in abeyance, and any 
7 criminal defense attorney would be able to identify those 
8 issues and deal with that. 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 MR. THOMAS: Also, the underlying offense is not being 
11 tried. A person (inaudible) that he has acknowledged that 
12 Mr. Beaslin is representing, would or may have been a witness 
13 in the State's case prior to the plea, but that's not the issue 
14 here either. 
15 So — and there were a few other issues, but I think 
16 based on the Court's ruling I need not say anything about that. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, help me with this one. I am concerned 
18 about this one. 
19 MR. THOMAS: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: The statute says a plea in abeyance cannot 
21 exceed three years. What are we going to do with that? 
22 MR. THOMAS: I reviewed that statute as well, and that 
23 was brought up, of course, by the defendant in his handwritten 
24 motion. In examining that statute, the first response the 
25 State has is, number one, this was a carefully negotiated plea, 
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1 and the purpose for the six year plea in abeyance was for — at 
2 the outset was because the defendant owed in excess of $250,000 
3 in restitution. 
4 THE COURT: Well, obviously it was for his benefit to 
5 extend it so that he could comply. 
6 MR. THOMAS: It was. 
7 THE COURT: That's a given. 
8 MR. THOMAS: Right. 
9 THE COURT: But the statute doesn't seem to — 
10 MR. THOMAS: The statute doesn't give a leeway for 
11 that. What typically will happen, as the Court is aware, is if 
12 we come along for a review for a plea in abeyance and someone 
13 hasn't complied,with it, then the Court will extend that plea 
14 in abeyance for a longer period of time. 
15 THE COURT: That happens all the time. 
16 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, and in this particular case — and 
17 it's similar to a probation terminating and restarting. In 
18 this particular case we wrote into the agreement for the 
19 benefit of the defendant the six years. 
•20 However, if the Court finds that that portion of the 
21 plea agreement is in violation of the statute, the State — and 
22 if we don't — if the Court does not find that there has been 
23 substantial noncompliance, then the State would just ask that 
24 that portion of the plea in abeyance be stricken. That the 
25 length of the term be changed in the agreement to reflect the 
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1 appropriate three years, and the amount of restitution be 
2 adjusted so that the payments are larger and more frequent. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin, do you want to speak to that? 
4 MR. BEASLIN: Well, I've reviewed that motion also, 
5 your Honor. That's 77-2 (a)2(5) on that three-year abeyance as 
6 indicated. I think that heretofore on pleas of abeyance, if 
7 the — if they can only comply within a particular time, then 
8 they generally extend it to go that way anyway. So I think 
9 that that's kind of where we are on that, but it is in the code 
10 a three-year statute for felonies in the — that he be brought 
11 up then. 
12 But like I say, if that were to happen, you'd really 
13 have to kick up the payments to double what they are now. 
14 Right now they're $22,500 every six months. That would be a 
15 $45,000 payment every six months if you were to change it to a 
16 three-year statute, your Honor. 
17 MR. THOMAS: And if I may also add before the Court 
18 makes a ruling, this particular hearing is brought within the 
19 three-year time period. He entered his plea on November 26th 
20 of 2002. So any determination that the Court makes either 
21 that the plea was not complied with or that that term was not 
22 within the meaning of the statute, I think the Court still 
23 has jurisdiction even under the statute to either apply 
24 noncompliance within the three-year period or alter that 
25 portion of the agreement, your Honor. 
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1 MR. THOMAS: That's what the State requests. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to rule on this. 
3 I think with the statute — although the statute is fairly 
4 mandatory, "shall not exceed three years," I think that because 
5 of the fact that the attorneys negotiated this plea in abeyance 
6 to accommodate the defendant in not setting him up to fail, 
7 but giving him an opportunity to do what he agreed to do, the 
8 — whether the language said three years to be renewed or six 
9 years, I think in substance I can't demonstrate any prejudice 
10 to the defendant. I'm going to say that it's okay. 
11 The other thing I need to talk about, I guess, is that 
12 the defendant says that he was not advised of his right to be 
13 sentenced timely. I had my clerk go back and get the record 
14 out and look at the actual transcript of the hearing, and the 
15 following dialogue happened. 
16 In fact, as I recall, Mr. Nakamura went through the 
17 dialo gue of all of the rights pretty fast and indicated that 
18 Mr. Schubarth understood those. I thought Mr. Nakamura went 
19 through it pretty fast, so I went though them again. I went 
20 through them again. 
21 The following language from the record says that I 
22 said, quote, "You will need to raise your right to a speedy 
23 trial, speedy sentencing, speedy trial rights because of the 
24 fact this agreement runs for six years. We need to understand 
25 you're giving up that right," end of quote. The defendant 
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1 responded, "Yes, your Honor." So I think that's pretty well 
2 covered, and I'm going to deny his motion on that. 
3 I guess what we need to do now, Mr. Schubarth, are 
4 there any — is there anything that's still out there I haven't 
5 ruled on? 
6 MR. SCHUBARTH: Well, your Honor, I'm reviewing the 
7 notes of the hearing on the 26th, I believe, of November, and 
8 I pled no contest, but that everything was held in abeyance. I 
9 didn't plead guilty to anything. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I guess we can find out by looking at 
11 the record, because the document — the plea agreement doesn't 
12 — says everything was held in abeyance, but there's some other 
13 stuff in the file that I looked at that said he did enter pleas 
14 to some of them. 
15 MR. SCHUBARTH: It's right here, your Honor. 
16 MR. THOMAS: Let me look at that. 
17 MR. SCHUBARTH: Everything was held in abeyance. 
18 THE COURT: The record will straighten this out. We 
19 don't need to even argue about it. The record will straighten 
20 that out. 
21 MR. THOMAS: I think it's actually on page 19 of the 
22 plea in abeyance agreement, even though they're not numbered. 
23 MR. SCHUBARTH: Which paragraph? 
24 MR. THOMAS: Towards the bottom. It says, "Counts 
25 XXIII to XXVI, sale of unregistered securities was entered 
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1 against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced on 
2 said charges." 
3 THE COURT: Where are we? Help me with this. 
4 MR. BEASLIN: On page 19. 
5 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, it's on the bottom of page 19. 
6 THE COURT: Well, mine isn't numbered. So I would — 
7 is it where we're talking about Count XXVI? 
8 MR. THOMAS: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, and where on the page is that 
10 language? 
11 MR. THOMAS: Toward the very bottom, that last 
12 paragraph in the little slash mark there where the defendant 
13 would have initialed it. It says, "Counts XXIII to XXVI, sale 
14 of unregistered securities." The document some indentation — 
15 or the page has some indentation on it. If I may approach, it 
16 may be helpful. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. Show me and then show Mr. Beaslin. 
18 MR. BEASLIN: I have it here, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Oh, I was way off. Okay. 
20 MR. THOMAS: Right in there. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. THOMAS: Mr. Beaslin has that, but the language 
23 states, "Counts XXIII to XXVI, sale of unregistered securities 
24 will then enter against the defendant. The defendant will then 
25 be sentenced on said charges." Then it goes into our agreement 
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1 that we would not argue for jail or prison if he paid the 
2 substantial restitution. 
3 So even in the plea in abeyance document itself 
4 it was always anticipated that he would — that those counts 
5 would enter against him. The only thing that was delayed 
6 or held in abeyance was the sentencing so that he could take 
7 into consideration — so that the State would take into 
8 consideration his compliance with payment. 
9 The previous paragraphs to that set forth two 
10 different circumstances wherein if he paid his restitution 
11 early, we would make a more generous recommendation versus if 
12 he did not pay his — 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. THOMAS: — restitution early on the sentencing, 
15 but it was always considered that he would — that there would 
16 be some counts entered against the defendant. 
17 THE COURT: And Counts XXIII to XXVI were in fact 
18 entered? 
19 MR. THOMAS: Yeah. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, and that was my understanding, but 
21 I couldn't — it's been so long I couldn't find it in this 
22 agreement. 
23 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, and that's where it is in the 
24 agreement itself. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. So I'll let you proceed, Mr. Thomas. 
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1 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, your Honor. I would call 
2 Mike Hines. 
3 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony 
4 you're about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
5 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
6 you God? 
7 THE WITNESS: I do. 
8 MICHAEL HINES, 
9 having been first duly sworn, 
10 testified as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. THOMAS: 
13 Q. Will you please introduce yourself to the Court. 
14 A. Yes, I am Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement 
15 for the Utah Division of Securities. 
16 Q. And how long has this been your position? 
17 A. Since 1995, June the 1st. 
18 Q. And what are your duties in that particular position? 
19 A. I supervise the investigators and attorneys that 
20 oversee the administrative, civil and criminal sanctions for 
21 securities violations. 
22 Q. And on occasion do you involve yourself with an 
23 investigation of complaints of securities violations? 
24 A. On occasion I do, yes. 
25 Q. Did you in fact involve yourself with an investigation 
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1 on a report of a Michael Schubarth? 
2 A. I did, yes. 
3 Q. Okay, and Michael Schubarth is the defendant in 
4 today's action seated at the defense Counsel's table? 
5 A. That is correct. I recognize him. 
6 Q. And during that investigation you actually were able 
7 to speak with him; is that correct? 
8 A. That is correct, I was. 
9 Q. And identify who he was? 
10 A. That is correct, yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Now, moving on, not discussing the specific 
12 investigation you did, but more toward were there charges filed 
13 against the defendant, based on your investigation? 
14 A. Yes, they were. 
15 Q. Okay, and there were a substantial number of charges? 
16 A. That is correct, like 37. 
17 Q. And let me ask you, were you involved in discussions 
18 with the County Attorney and defense Counsel during the plea 
19 negotiations between the State and the defendant, Michael 
20 Schubarth? 
21 A. Yes, numerous times. 
22 Q. Okay, and were you also present in Court when the 
23 defendant actually entered pleas? 
24 A. Yes, sir, I was. 
25 Q. Okay, and was the defendant represented by Counsel at 
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1 that time? 
2 A. Yes, at that time Blake Nakamura was representing 
3 Mr. Schubarth. 
4 Q. And during the plea negotiations and also — well, let 
5 me just go directly to the hearing. During the hearing where 
6 the defendant entered his pleas, did the defendant acknowledge 
7 that he understood the pleas and the agreement that he was 
8 entering? 
9 MR. BEASLIN: I think I'd object to that as to what he 
10 knows, your Honor. He doesn't know what Mr. Schubarth was 
11 thinking at the time. 
12 MR. THOMAS: I didn't ask for a thought. I asked if he 
13 had — if the defendant acknowledged that he understood. 
14 THE COURT: Okay, I'll allow that. 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, both outside and in the courtroom, 
16 both. 
17 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: Okay, and was there a written plea 
18 agreement as part of the — in this entry of plea? 
19 A. Yes, sir, there was. 
20 Q. Okay. Now, that particular agreement — you're 
21 familiar with the legal term "plea in abeyance;" is that 
22 correct? 
23 A. I am. We recommend them from the Division quite 
24 often. That's correct. 
25 Q. And in this case that was what was — a portion of the 
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1 counts were recommended in this case had a plea entered and 
2 held in abeyance,- is that correct? 
3 A. Yes, that is correct. 
4 Q. And as part of the terms of that plea in abeyance 
5 the defendant was required to make restitution to a number of 
6 victims in this case? 
7 A. That is correct. 
8 Q. And do you recall roughly the amount of restitution 
9 that was ordered? 
10 A. It was in excess of $200,000, but I don't remember the 
11 exact amount. 
12 Q. Okay, and was it also ordered then that he was to make 
13 regular payments specifically approximately $22,000 each six 
14 months? 
15 A. That is correct. 
16 Q. Now, was that a term that was carefully negotiated and 
17 carefully explained that it had to be complied with? 
18 A. It was, and Mr. Nakamura made it very clear that if 
19 we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic, we 
20 would be setting Mr. Schubarth up to fail, and there was a lot 
21 of — a lot of discussion that went into the dollar amount that 
22 Mr. Schubarth felt he could actually pay in satisfaction to the 
23 victims. 
24 Q. Okay, and was the timing, each six months, also a 
25 significant part of the plea negotiations and actually formed 
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1 a portion of the agreement? 
2 A. That's correct. The State's interest and the 
3 Division's interest was in getting back some money to the 
4 investors who had lost this amount of money. So we made it 
5 very clear in those discussions that those deadlines would have 
6 to be met. 
7 Q. Okay. Now, let me also ask you, then, this agreement 
8 was entered November 26th of the year 2002; is that correct? 
9 A. That is correct, yes. 
10 Q. Okay. So the first six-month period would roughly be 
11 around the May 26th date — 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. — of 2003? 
14 A. That's correct, and we actually set a date with 
15 Mr. Nakamura that he understood. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, if I can retrieve these. 
17 MR. SCHUBARTH: I have a copy. 
18 MR. THOMAS: Okay, may I approach the witness? 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: I'm handing you what's been marked as 
21 State's Exhibit No. 1. Do you recognize that exhibit? 
22 A. I do, yes. 
23 Q. And have you briefly reviewed that exhibit? 
24 A. I have reviewed it, yes, sir. 
25 Q. Okay, and is that a certified copy of restitution 
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1 payments made by the defendant in this matter? 
2 A. Yes, it is certified. 
3 Q. Okay, and does it indicate when the first payment came 
4 in from the defendant? 
5 A. Yes, sir, it does. 
6 Q. And what date is shown on that document that was the 
7 first payment? 
8 A. On May the 28th of 2003, approximately two,days after 
9 the due date, there was a payment made of $10,000. 
10 Q. Okay, and that was roughly just less than half of what 
11 was owed? 
12 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. 
13 Q. Okay, and what was — do the documents also reflect 
14 the date of the second payment? 
15 A. Yes, sir, they do. 
16 Q. And what date did the second payment come in? 
17 A. On July the 8th of 2003 there was a payment of $12,880. 
18 Q. And that would have completed the amount that was 
19 necessary for one payment? 
20 A. Yes, if roughly two months late. 
21 Q. Okay. So in fact, the defendant was just shy of two 
22 months late completing that portion? 
23 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. 
24 MR. THOMAS: All right. Your Honor, I would offer 
25 State's Exhibit No. 1. It is — as a self-authenticating 
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1 document. It is a certified copy of the restitution payments 
2 received in this case. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Beaslin? 
4 MR. BEASLIN: No objection, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Court will receive those. 
6 (Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence.) 
7 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: After this plea had entered, had you 
8 received notification from any Nevada authority that the 
9 defendant had been charged with issuing a bad check? 
10 A. Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney General's 
11 Office that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant 
12 had been issued for his arrest for issuing a bad check. 
13 Q. Okay. During that were you also notified and/or did 
14 you have an opportunity to review documents that defendant also 
15 received a warrant for failure to appear in that particular 
16 case? 
17 A. Yes, that's correct. That was — the warrant was for 
18 failure to appear in the bad check case. 
19 MR. BEASLIN: Did anything — just on voir dire just a 
20 minute. 
21 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
23 Q. Do you have anything after June 3rd, 2003 to determine 
24 whether or not he was picked up on that or failed to appear? 
25 A. On that particular warrant, I do not. 
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1 Q. Nothing after that? 
2 A. I have no knowledge of what occurred after that. We 
3 ended up with another warrant being issued, so I don't know the 
4 disposition of the original warrant. 
5 Q. So this really addresses a charge having been filed 
6 and his failure to appear, but it doesn't say what happened to 
7 it, right? 
8 A. That is correct. 
9 MR. BEASLIN: I think maybe I'd object to that, your 
10 Honor, as to the issue because it doesn't set forth what 
11 happened after that or if he was picked up or what happened. 
12 It only says a charge was made. 
13 THE COURT: I'll receive it, but as a matter of weight 
14 I don't — I question, you know, whether — I'll receive it. 
15 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I'm going to offer Exhibit 2, 
16 and it is not — it's not presented for any more than what 
17 weight it does carry, your Honor. 
18 MR. BEASLIN: That it was just filed, is all; is that 
19 what you're saying? 
20 MR. THOMAS: Correct, it was filed and that there was a 
21 failure to — 
22 MR. BEASLIN: But no action? 
23 MR. THOMAS: Well, we — I don't know whether there was 
24 action or not. 
25 MR. BEASLIN: After that? 
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1 MR. THOMAS: Yeah. I don't know. All I'm presenting 
2 the Court is that there were these criminal charges filed. 
3 That's what weight it is to carry. 
4 (Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence.) 
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
6 BY MR. THOMAS: 
7 Q. Let me also ask you, did you have conversations with 
8 the Nevada securities authorities in regards to concerns that 
9 they had about business transactions that the defendant was 
10 involved with? 
11 A. I did, and I initiated that conversation in probably 
12 May of 2003. I received a phone call from Clifton Reeves, who 
13 told me that he was a victim of a crime of Mr. Schubarth. In 
14 response to that I contacted Charles Moore with the Division of 
15 Securities in Nevada. I also ended up contacting the Division 
16 of Financial Institutions in Nevada. 
17 Q. Okay, and as part of that are you familiar with a 
18 cease and desist order that was issued by the Nevada Securities 
19 Division in relation to Mr. Schubarth? 
20 A. I believe it was issued by the financial institutions. 
21 Q. Okay, and exactly what is that cease and desist order 
22 in relation to this case? Were you — if you can explain to 
23 the Court what happened. 
24 A. Mr. Schubarth was ordered to cease any of his 
25 unlicensed loan activity at that point in time. 
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1 Q. Okay, and that was based on a concern that in fact he 
2 was involving himself with unlicensed loans; is that correct? 
3 A. That is correct. Taking fees on unlicensed — and 
4 offering unlicensed loans. 
5 Q. Okay, and specifically that would have been a 
6 violation of Nevada code? 
7 A. That would be a violation of their Financial 
8 Institutions Code, yes. 
9 Q. Okay. Now, let me move beyond the cease and desist 
10 order that was issued, and did you receive any additional 
11 information that an actual criminal investigation was underway? 
12 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. And did you have an opportunity to visit with the 
14 investigator of that case? 
15 A. Yes, many times. 
16 Q. And who was that? 
17 A. Teresa Duffy, D-u-f-f-y. 
18 Q. And did you visit with her about the charges — or the 
19 allegations that were being made, and the potential criminal 
20 charges against the defendant? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: Your Honor, I would object to that as 
23 being hearsay, your Honor. 
24 MR. THOMAS: And based on the nature of this hearing 
25 being an order to show cause hearing, I believe that there is a 
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1 — well, I'm certain that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed, 
2 particularly as to hearsay. 
3 I am going to lay some foundation, though, wherein 
4 the State will be admitting and/or submitting to the Court 
5 certified copies of Court records which can come before 
6 the Court, because they are certified copies and self-
7 authenticating. Part of those will include a probable cause 
8 statement. 
9 I thought it would be helpful for the Court, however, 
10 to utilize a witness on the stand to discuss the contents of 
11 that probable cause statement, but I can do it either way, your 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I'm going to allow it as being trustworthy 
14 and foundational. 
15 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: Okay. Let me go back, then, to the 
16 question. In your conversations with Ms. Duffy concerning the 
17 criminal allegations, did she indicate to you what the concern 
18 was and what potential charges there may be? 
19 A. Yes, she did. We discussed with the prosecutor and 
20 with — or I discussed with the prosecutor and Teresa Duffy — 
21 THE COURT: Can you give me a time frame on this? 
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, that would have probably 
23 been late May of 2003, or May of 2003, but we discussed the 
24 allegations of two complaints; one from Vanessa Wright, and the 
25 other one from Mr. Reves. As to whether or not those would be 
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violations of securities laws — and we discussed cases such 
as United States versus Austin, which makes those transaction 
securities — also there was alternate potential charges that 
could be filed, which subsequently were filed. I believe those 
were theft related or theft by deception related charges. 
Q. BY MR. THOMAS: Okay, and did you also discuss and have 
an opportunity to review the probable cause statement that was 
filed with the criminal information in those matters? 
A. Yes, I've read several versions of those, yes. 
Q. Okay. Can you just briefly explain to the Court the 
11 conduct that was set forth in those probable cause statements 
12 
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that were alleged to be violations of law? 
A. Certainly. The first two charges are felony theft 
charges which deal with what we refer to in the industry as an 
advanced fee scheme. That is, you go to someone, allege that 
you can make for them a large loan, and you ask for money up 
front. You subsequently fail to deliver the loan, and keep the 
advance. Those constitute the two theft charges. 
The subsequent charges that were filed dealt with 
money that was supposed to be held in escrow by Mr. Schubarth 
and his misuse of that money. 
Q. In other words, it was not actually held in escrow? 
A. That's correct. It was spent from the escrow account. 
Q. And that would be a violation of law? 
A. In Nevada and in Utah. 
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1 Q. Okay, and did in fact criminal — was a criminal 
2 Information filed in Nevada? 
3 A. Yes, it was. 
4 MR. THOMAS: Okay. Your Honor, I would offer State's 
5 Exhibit No. 3, which is a certified copy of the criminal 
6 Information. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Beaslin, have you seen that? 
8 MR. BEASLIN: I have a copy that's certified, your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: And that criminal Information charges 
12 four charges that are considered felonies; is that correct? 
13 A. That is correct. 
14 Q. Now, let me ask you, was there any relation or concern 
15 that the defendant was engaging in similar types of conduct in 
16 Nevada that we had had occurring in Utah? 
17 A. Only in that he entered his agreement on securities 
18 violations in the state of Utah, and in the state of Utah we 
19 would have filed a conduct of securities violations, but other 
20 than that the scheme to defraud was different. 
21 Q. But it was still a scheme to defraud, nonetheless? 
22 A. I would have reached that conclusion if asked to 
23 apply, yes. 
24 Q. Okay, and if — yeah, if I can just now give the 
25 Court some background on what types of conduct the State was 
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1 concerned with in the Utah case. What types of schemes did he 
2 use here? 
3 A. In the State of Utah Mr. Schubarth through agents 
4 offered and sold promissory notes to numerous individuals. 
5 Promissory notes are securities, and he did totally inadequate 
6 disclosure. Basically he failed to disclose that the issuer 
7 of the notes — that is, High Desert Financial — had filed a 
8 bankruptcy, fresh bankruptcy, and that Mr. Schubarth, the maker 
9 of the note and the signer of the note, also had a bankruptcy. 
10 Q. And during that investigation did you also do an 
11 analysis or — and/or a partial analysis of the defendant's 
12 use of (inaudible) coming from Utah into his (inaudible), and 
13 did it appear that he was using them for investment purposes, 
14 as he had suggested to investors? 
15 A. Well, it appeared that he used the money for his own 
16 expenses. 
17 Q. And is that similar to what it appeared he used the 
18 money in Nevada? 
19 A. That is correct. 
20 Q. And do you know whether those four counts, there has 
21 been any significant hearing in the state of Nevada concerning 
22 the criminal charges? 
23 A. Yes, there was a probable cause hearing in which 
24 Mr. Schubarth was bound over to stand trial on all four 
25 felonies. 
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1 MR. BEASLIN: I have a copy. 
2 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I have a certified copy also 
3 of the bind over order, and a proffer. It says, "It appearing 
4 to me by the evidence or waiver of preliminary hearing, 
5 preliminary examinations that there is probable cause to 
6 believe that the offenses have been committed," listing four 
7 counts of theft, felonies in the state of Nevada. I would 
8 offer this as an exhibit. 
9 THE COURT: That's Exhibit what? 
10 MR. THOMAS: 4. 
11 THE COURT: 4. I'll receive 4. 
12 (Exhibit No. 4 received into evidence.) 
13 MR. THOMAS: Thank you. Nothing further of this 
14 witness. 
15 CROSS EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
17 Q. Mr. Hines has referenced to you and Mr. Nakamura and 
18 Mr. Thomas saying at the negotiating stage in November 26 of 
19 2002. Where did you folks meet or how did you get together to 
20 come up with that agreement? 
21 A. Most of the discussions were outside of the courtroom. 
22 There had been numerous telephone calls between Mr. Nakamura 
23 and myself and Mr. Thomas and myself, but it took — if I 
24 remember correctly, more than an hour out in the hallway 
25 negotiating. 
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1 Q. But prior to that — this is November 26th — would it 
2 have been like September, October, November, a period of time 
3 to accumulate that agreement? 
4 A. Uh, yes. 
5 Q. It wasn't done that day. 
6 A. It — 
7 Q. It was assigned that day, but it — you negotiated 
8 before that; is that correct? 
9 A. We negotiated extensively before that, but there were 
10 a lot of changes made that particular day. 
11 Q. The question or the no contest changes that appear in 
12 the affidavit? 
13 A. Well, I believe the — yeah, the no contest was a 
14 discussion Mr. Nakamura and I had earlier, and the Division 
15 had no objections to a nolo plea. Certainly discussions of 
16 whether or not the Division would be supportive of a plea in 
17 abeyance on a number of the counts was discussed. All of these 
18 discussions cumulated in the discussions in the hallway. 
19 Q. And do you recall, were you at the hearing on May 2 8th 
20 when the matter was reviewed? Do you recall coming — that was 
21 after the first six-month period, and then the payment was made 
22 on the 28th. 
23 A. I don't believe I was present for that. I don't 
24 remember that. 
25 Q. So you didn't come out to that hearing to determine 
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1 whether or not there had been compliance with the plea in 
2 abeyance? 
3 A. I did not, that I remember. 
4 Q. Were you then notified by Mr. Thomas or somebody else 
5 that the payment — a $10,000 payment had been made? 
6 A. I was notified that the payment was late, and then 
7 subsequently notified a few months later that the rest of the 
8 first due payment had been made. 
9 Q. Okay, and also you indicated and testified that you 
10 became aware of the Nevada problem sometime in May; is that 
11 true? 
12 A. Yes, that is correct. 
13 Q. And then you carried on conversations and so forth 
14 with the Nevada authorities as to what was going on with 
15 Mr. Schubarth at that time? 
16 A. Yes, sir,-that's correct. 
17 Q. And up to the time on August 19th when the complaints 
18 were actually filed in the Justice Court in Nevada, the amended 
19 complaint that was filed against Mr. Schubarth not in the 
20 District Court, but in the Justice Court, which was the 
21 pleadings that we had in the transcript of the bind over, it's 
22 Exhibit 4. 
23 A. Forgive me, I lost your question in that. 
24 Q. My question is whether or not these four — you were 
25 aware that the Justice Court — the initial complaint was filed 
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1 August 19th in Nevada? 
2 A. I'm not sure I knew the exact date it was filed. I 
3 was certainly in negotiation with — or not negotiation, but 
4 discussions with authorities in Nevada up until the point in 
5 time and subsequent to the point in time that those charges 
6 were- filed. 
7 Q. And that was with Ms. Duffy? 
8 A. Teresa Duffy and then also at least one or more of the 
9 prosecutors in Nevada. 
10 Q. Yeah, the preliminary hearing was not held until 
11 October in November — October and November of 2003. It was 
12 after the filing in August of these pleadings that we have here 
13 today; is that correct? 
14 A. That is correct, right. 
15 Q. And the bind over went up to the District Court on 
16 November 10th, it looks like, in Nevada, from this document 
17 here? 
18 A. Yes, the dates on the document would be correct. 
19 Q. You indicated that there was really not a similarity 
20 with the transaction in Utah as opposed to the transactions in 
21 Nevada. Those charges, of course, are theft, theft, theft, and 
22 false pretenses, and (inaudible) and embezzlement, whereas 
23 yours were securities fraud, most of them? 
24 A. That's correct, yes. 
25 Q. Okay, on the charges he did plea to that are evidenced 
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1 in the affidavit in abeyance of this guilty plea? 
2 A. Yes, those were securities transactions. However, the 
3 conduct Mr. Schubarth did in the state of Nevada subsequent to 
4 his plea we would have charged as securities fraud in the state 
5 of Utah, rather than a theft. 
6 Q. I see. So your testimony you would have filed 
7 differently if it had occurred in Utah rather than in Nevada? 
8 A. Yes, sir, that is correct. 
9 Q. Based on what Ms. Duffy told you and on her report? 
10 A. No. Based on the representations made by the two 
11 victims of Mr. Schubarth. 
12 Q. I see, Mr. (Inaudible) and (Inaudible)? 
13 A. That's who — that's correct, yes. 
14 MR. BEASLIN: All right, thank you. 
15 MR. THOMAS: Nothing further, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
17 MR. THOMAS: State has no further witnesses. We'll 
18 submit it. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. BEASLIN: May I have a minute. Judge? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: Okay, we'd call Mr. Schubarth. 
23 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you 
24 are about to give in the case now before the Court will be the 
25 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
-35-
1 God? 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
3 MICHAEL R. SCHUBARTH, 
4 having been first duly sworn, 
5 testified as follows: 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
8 Q. Would you state your name, please. 
9 A. Michael middle initial "R" Schubarth. 
10 Q. And Mr. Schubarth, you have been present during the 
11 testimony of Mr. Hines; have you not? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And would you dispute any of the statements that he 
14 has made — 
15 A. I dispute — 
16 Q. — with reference to the securities and with reference 
17 to your conduct? 
18 A. I dispute virtually everything he said. 
19 Q. In what manner? 
20 A. Well, first and foremost, it's my understanding there 
21 was no extensive negotiation of any plea in abeyance agreement. 
22 When I showed up on the 26th of November my attorney dropped the 
23 agreement on me. We argued extensively in the conference room 
24 outside. 
25 We almost walked away from here and went to trial, 
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1 because I had no knowledge of the plea agreement whatsoever, 
2 and my attorney explained to me that it was in my best interest 
3 to take the plea, in that it was — there would be subject to 
4 review every six months. 
5 That the payments were only a watermark, as it were. 
6 That if I could make a payment within six months. If I was 
7 short, then I could make it up in the next six-month review. I 
8 could pay any amount at any time. It could have been floating. 
9 I was not told that I pled guilty to anything. My 
10 understanding and in the hearing documents that I pled no 
11 contest, and everything was held in abeyance for a six-year 
12 period. No one explained to me the law about three-year 
13 statute. If that would have been explained to me I would nave 
14 not taken the plea whatsoever and we would have gone to Court. 
15 I don't believe I'm guilty, and I have not broken the law. 
16 My understanding also the plea in abeyance agreement, 
17 that if I fell short on the payments or if I was convicted of 
18 any crime, that would be cause for substantial failure of the 
19 plea agreement. So I have not been convicted of any crimes. 
20 I've been alleged of some crimes that are totally false. I 
21 have nothing to do with securities. 
22 I talked to Dan — David Evans in the securities 
23 division. I've talked to him substantially for years after 
24 Mr. Hines had stirred up trouble for me in Nevada, and I think 
25 it was in July specifically that there was talk about a warrant 
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1 for my arrest in Nevada and this bad check charge. I talked to 
2 David Evans and I said, "Do you guys have a problem with me?" 
3 He said, "No, you haven't violated any securities laws." 
4 So I've done everything that I know possible to stay 
5 clean, to stay with this agreement, even though I wasn't in 
6 agreement with the agreement, and I only saw it that morning 
7 when I arrived here, and I was told that I had to substantially 
8 not comply with it for it to fall off. 
9 I was the one that sweetened it, so to speak. They 
10 put it out at six years, the State did. I came back and said, 
11 "If I can make these alleged victims whole within the first 
12 year, at the end of 2003, can all this go away and he reduced 
13 down to a Class A, attempted sale, I believe, one count?" Then 
14 after that was entered there was a conversation of then it 
15 being expunged from my record so that there would be no record 
16 of this whatsoever. 
17 It's always been my position as well as the State's 
18 that the alleged victims are made whole here. Not that I go to 
19 prison, not that I be put away, and not that they not receive 
20 any restitution whatsoever. It's always been the position of 
21 myself and the State to make these people whole, whether I did 
22 anything wrong or not, or anybody else was guilty. 
23 With regards to — I covered the plea negotiations. 
24 With regards to the bad check allegation, the failure to 
25 appear, I received a summons by mail I believe it was the end 
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1 of May. It was on a Friday. It was certified letter. I don't 
2 know that I signed for it or if somebody in the office signed 
3 for it. It was stuck in a pile of papers. Apparently the 
4 following Monday was a Court date. I didn't know anything 
5 about it. The envelope was never opened. 
6 Q. And you're talking about June 3rd of 2003? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. I had no knowledge whatsoever of that Court date. 
10 Q. Has it subsequently been taken care of? 
11 A. Well, when we were working with — I was working with 
12 Mr. Nakamura, we were working towards the order to show cause 
13 hearing and the evidentiary hearing of August 2 9th. Some point 
14 in time in July he made me aware of the potential issue of the 
15 cease and desist order in the state of Nevada, as well as this 
16 check issue, and the warrant out for my arrest. I said, "I 
17 know nothing about it." 
18 I have dates, times, substance of every conversation 
19 for the most part that I had with Mr. Nakamura. I don't have 
20 those here, but I could refer to them if I had them. 
21 As soon as I heard about the failure to appear I 
22 called the Sparks Justice Court. I asked them about it, 
23 inquired. They explained to me that there was a failure to 
24 appear. I asked them what I needed to do to resolve it. They 
25 said there was a $500 cash only bond that was due. I said, 
-39-
1 "How could I get it to you?" They said I could send it via 
2 Western Union Quick Pay, I believe it was. 
3 Immediately that day, as soon as I found out about 
4 it, I got $500 cash, wired it — or Western Unioned it to the 
5 Court, and I was supposed to show up I believe it was the end 
6 of July for an arraignment. I was arraigned, and then it was 
7 set aside for a prelim. At the prelim- I pled not guilty to a 
8 failure to appear and not guilty on the check charge. 
9 Subsequently — 
10 Q. How much was the check for; do you recall? 
11 A. $79. It was less than $100. 
12 Q. The whole thing? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay, go ahead. 
15 A. Since that time there was — Court was set for 
16 December 4th to hear that. Subsequently I was in custody 
17 because I self-surrendered in Menden on August 29th. So I 
18 was in Court. I had an attorney named William Rouses. He 
19 called the Court at that time and got an extension to October 
20 the 14th, I believe it was. No disposition was done on that 
21 case whatsoever. 
22 I was still in custody. Mr. Rouses was supposed to 
23 get another extension, and I believe — I don't know for sure, 
24 but I believe he entered my plea of not guilty. Mr. Rouses 
25 paid a $10,1 find out of his own trust account, and the Court 
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1 refunded my $500 bail. They sent it back to me and that case 
2 was closed, as far as I know, because the Court sent my bail 
3 back to me. 
4 Q. That was my question. So that case is closed, right? 
5 A. I believe so. 
6 Q. (Inaudible) about that and Mr. Thomas what happened 
7 after June 3rd. That's my question. So as far as you know it's 
8 out of (inaudible). 
9 A. That's the series of — that's the series of events, 
10 but I don't know how they could have entered my plea, because 
11 I'd never went to Court because I'd been in custody that whole 
12 time, but I know that they refunded my bail money of $500. 
13 Q. All right. So you got your money back on that one? 
14 A. Correct. 
15 Q. Okay, and the next issue. Do you — 
16 A. The other issue is the accusation on the cease and 
17 desist that I received — I believe originally I received it in 
18 March of 2003. Mr. Rives and Vanessa Wright were complaining 
19 — they entered into some contracts with me to do some work for 
20 them. I did the work. I performed. They were not happy, and 
21 subsequently now they're trying to cause me some trouble. 
22 My understanding from talking to Mr. Rives that he 
23 did call Mr. Hines sometime first part of 2003, and Mr. Hines 
24 represented to Mr. Rives that I was convicted in the state of 
25 Utah, which made Mr. Rives panic. There is no judgment of 
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1 conviction here in the state of Nevada. That's what started 
2 
3 the ball rolling, I mean, in the state of Utah. There's no 
4 judgment of conviction here. 
5 My client at that time was panicked, thinking I 
6 was a convicted criminal in the state of Utah and I did not 
7 disclose that. They complained to the Department of Financial 
8 Institutions. At that point in time I was made aware of that. 
9 I had it in writing. 
10 I contacted the financial institutions. I don't know 
11 the investigator right now. I have it all memorialized in a 
12 file in my office. I talked to him, talked to him and talked 
13 to him, explained to him what I was doing. 
14 I was in fact an employee of Mortgage IT, which is a 
15 mortgage company out of New York. I was operating in that 
16 branch. I was a legally licensed mortgage broker in the state 
17 of Nevada under their license. He contacted legal counsel in 
18 New York. They went back and forth. It was — I was told and 
19 I have it in writing that that issue of the cease and desist, I 
20 was not violating any laws because I was operating legally 
21 under another license. I made sure that I was complying with 
22 law. 
23 After this, I believe about six months passed after 
24 that. No one heard anything on it until — 
25 Q. Excuse me, did you have a hearing on the cease and 
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1 desist order? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. As to its validity or otherwise? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. In Nevada? 
6 A. No, nothing. All they did was issue a cease and 
7 desist. They didn't file a complaint. They didn't file a 
8 suit. 
9 Q. Did you comply with that order? 
10 A. Pardon me? 
11 Q. Did you comply with that order? 
12 A. Yes, I wasn't in violation of it. About six months 
13 passed, to about July. Then I get the rumblings that the 
14 Department of Financial Institutions is going to move forward 
15 on the cease and desist. 
16 I faxed another fax to the investigator that I was 
17 working with in March and said, "Hey, I thought this was 
18 resolved. I haven't heard anything. Would you please resend 
19 the cease and desist." 
20 I then went personally into the Financial Institution 
21 Office, which is in Carson City, which I live, and talked to 
22 I think a Larry — I want to say Hatfield, but I can't — I 
23 don't know that that's correct. Talked to him and there was an 
24 investigator or someone else that worked with the AG's office 
25 there, and I explained to them that I thought that that cease 
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1 and desist was resolved in March. Would they give me a 
2 rescinsion. 
3 "We don't give recinsions," they said. "We just leave 
4 it out there. You're just not supposed to violate it." Well, 
5 I didn't violate it and it was proven that I was an employee of 
6 a mortgage company and licensed appropriately. 
7 Subsequently the financial institutions took it to the 
8 Department of Consumer Affairs, and I have some copies of the 
9 correspondence with me, that they wanted to see how they could 
10 get me on this cease and desist. There was two complaints of 
11 taking money supposedly without providing a service. 
12 The Department of Consumer Affairs — or there was an 
13 interoffice memo. Everybody seemed to think there was nothing 
14 they could do. I was not in violations, number one. Number 
15 two, it was not a securities issue because they didn't know 
16 nothing about — the investigator with Securities Department, 
17 who I've talked to off and on for a couple of years since this 
18 thing started in 2000 — the year 2000. I was arrested in 
19 2001. I've been in touch with the people of Nevada. They knew 
20 where I was. They knew I had Counsel. They had no issue with 
21 securities issue. They had other things that came before them 
22 that wasn't securities issues. 
23 So this went on, from my understanding, a formal 
24 complaint. Finally they went out of the Department of 
25 Financial Institutions to the Department of Consumer Affairs 
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1 with the AG's Office sometime at the end of May. 
2 They couldn't make it stick on me with regards to the 
3 mortgage business, so they twisted it around and made it sound 
4 like I was obtaining money under false pretenses. Subsequently 
5 an investigation was held from about the end of May until about 
6 July or August when they issued the warrant for my arrest I 
7 believe on August 20th. 
8 Now, on August 20th, on August 20th when they issued 
9 that warrant, I had Counsel here in Utah, Blake Nakamura. 
10 The state of Nevada never contacted him and said, "We have a 
11 warrant for his arrest. Do you want to work a surrender?" 
12 I had Counsel in Nevada at the time, and I have two 
13 letters that put the State of Department of Securities on 
14 notice and the Department of Financial Institutions on notice 
15 that Ryan Earl — I'm sorry, yeah, Ryan Earl was my attorney 
16 of record. That if they had any problems, if they had anything 
17 to talk to him about, they should talk to him. They did not 
18 contact him whatsoever, and this was even in the midst when the 
19 warrant was issued. 
20 From my understanding there's a certain protocol or at 
21 least a — oh, what's the word. I don't want to say ethics, 
22 that if a warrant is issued and someone is represented by 
23 Counsel — and I was represented in two states, because I've 
24 got a lot of stuff going on — but they would say, "We have a 
25 warrant for your arrest — for your client's arrest. What do 
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1 you want to do about it?" 
2 Finding out after the fact, Ms. Duffy pigeonholed the 
3 warrant. Did not put it on NCIC, which is normal standard 
4 procedure. You put it on where everybody knows, "Hey, there's 
5 a warrant out for this guy's arrest." Did not put it on NCIC. 
6 The plan was for — to get me here for the order to show cause 
7 on August 29th and use that warrant as an exclamation point for 
8 that order to show cause and have me arrested here. 
9 We only found out about that warrant I believe late 
10 on the 27th, and I think that came from conversations from 
11 Mr. Thomas to Mr. Nakamura. He made me aware of that. The 
12 day of the 28th, which was the day prior to the 29th, being here, 
13 I had already had my plane ticket to come here. I'd already 
14 had my car rental set up to come here, my hotel. I have come 
15 here every single time for the last two-and-a-half years. 
16 Never missed a Court date. I've come here twice when I didn't 
17 need to. 
18 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I'd object. It's both non-
19 responsive and irrelevant. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, why don't we get off the narrative a 
21 little bit, and try and do this a little cleaner with questions 
22 and answers. I appreciate your telling me a story about it, 
23 but — 
24 THE WITNESS: I'm just trying to get in the facts, your 
25 Honor, you know, and I subsequently — 
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1 MR. THOMAS: Objection, nonresponsive. 
2 Q. BY MR. BEASLIN: Now, let me just ask you, then what 
3 happened on the 29th when you were supposed to be here in Vernal 
4 on the other charge? 
5 MR. THOMAS: Objection as to relevance. We haven't 
6 alleged anything in regards to the 29th. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think it goes to — somewhat to his 
8 ability to complete his performance here. I'll let him answer. 
9 Q. BY MR. BEASLIN: So let me just ask you, you turned 
10 yourself in on the 29th of August; is that true? 
11 A. Let me fast track. 
12 Q. Go ahead. 
13 THE WITNESS: Will you indulge me just for a minute, 
14 your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
16 THE WITNESS: I had a bailiff friend, a warrant's 
17 officer, a private investigator and two attorneys all try to 
18 get me to self-surrender on the 28th. It wasn't in the system. 
19 I couldn't. 
20 We got a copy, I believe, from Mr. Thomas of the 
21 warrant, and I saw the Judge's name who signed it, who I had 
22 been in front of his Court for ten years on civil matters, 
23 respected his signature, and I was in — I was — had my ticket 
24 and everything. I was in John Springate's office, and between 
25 him and Mr. Nakamura were on a conference call, and I found out 
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1 who the Judge was, and I said, "Well, out of respect for his 
2 Court." 
3 Then they said, "Now we know that you have a warrant 
4 out of Nevada, we can't suggest that you leave Nevada. So 
5 if you leave Nevada, you're a fugitive from Nevada and you'll 
6 be arrested in Utah. If you don't go to Utah, you'll be a 
7 fugitive from Utah. It's best — our suggestion to you, as 
8 Counsel — " and I was in Reno. I was five minutes from the 
9 airport to come here — "is that you self-surrender." 
10 So on the morning of the 29th I self-surrendered, like 
11 I had Counsel to do so, and soon as I got — as soon as I self-
12 surrendered, I had money in the bank. I could have paid my 
13 bail, I could have been out of there, and I had millions of 
14 dollars worth of business going on. I could have satisfied the 
15 plea in abeyance by the end of December. 
16 But as soon as I was booked into custody, someone from 
17 here called, said, "Do you have Schubarth in custody?" "Yes." 
18 Then there was a fugitive failure to appear from here. I 
19 wasn't a fugitive from the state. I wasn't in the state and 
20 left the state. I just was in custody and I couldn't come to 
21 the order to show cause hearing. 
22 Then subsequently I sat in jail there until I was 
23 finally able to bail out I believe on September 17th. Then we 
24 had the extradition hearing on the 19th of December, and the 
25 Judge said, "What do you want to do?" I said, "Get me to Utah 
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1 as fast as possible." They picked me up on the 29th and I've 
2 sat here ever since. 
3 Q. BY MR. BEASLIN: Now, what about October 20 — about 
4 the 14th of October you had a preliminary hearing? 
5 A. There was a preliminary hearing. 
6 Q. Were you there? 
7 A. Originally there was only two charges of obtaining 
8 money under false pretenses. 
9 Q. Were you there in Justice Court? 
10 A. I was there, but subsequently a third charge and a 
11 fourth charge was added after I was arrested. 
12 Q. Well, that's your second amended complaint, but 
13 pending before the District Court in Nevada in Douglas County, 
14 these four charges, right? 
15 A. Yeah, it hasn't been — 
16 Q. You're not convicted of any of those? 
17 A. It hasn't been proven. I haven't been proven guilty. 
18 It hasn't been to trial. It's set for I believe the end of 
19 February, with an alternative date in March and one in August, 
20 I believe. 
21 Q. Okay. Now, as to the issue of the money, the records 
22 would show and certify that you paid $10,000 May 28th, $12,880 
23 in July. Is that all of the payments that you've made? 
24 A. Those are the payments I've made. They were current 
25 at that time. As of July 8th I was compliant. Subsequently my 
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1 next payment was November 26thr and I was in custody, and I 
2 filed a motion with this Court for them — for this Court to 
3 extend my next payment. 
4 I thought I asked for the end of February, and then my 
5 cutoff date for the end of December, to extend that to the end 
6 of March so that I could still have the opportunity to comply, 
7 but since I've been jail, then, from that motion another couple 
8 months, I don't know that that is realistic, but I'm sure that 
9 if they moved it to the next review date, which was in May, 
10 that I could substantially comply. 
11 Q. So you've been in jail either in Nevada or in Utah 
12 since August 29th? 
13 A. Tomorrow will be 22 weeks. 
14 Q. Okay, I believe that's all. Anything else you have? 
15 A. No. 
16 MR. BEASLIN: Okay. All right, thank you. 
17 CROSS EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. THOMAS: 
19 Q. You were served a cease and desist order in Nevada? 
20 A. In March sometime. Actually if — I've — 
21 Q. I didn't ask for anything other than you were served a 
22 cease and desist order in Nevada. 
23 A. I was mailed a cease and desist order. 
24 Q. Okay, and you are very concerned about making the 
25 victims whole; is that a fair statement? 
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1 A. Very correct. 
2 Q. And as a matter of fact, you were so concerned about 
3 making the victims in Vernal whole, that you talked to 
4 Mr. Nakamura about a plan to have them paid off by the end 
5 of December? 
6 A. I didn't talk to him about a plan, no. 
7 Q. You talked to Mr. Nakamura and suggested that during 
8 the plea negotiations, if you had the victims paid off by 
9 December, it would be a better deal for you? 
10 A. There were no negotiations. Mr. Nakamura just dropped 
11 the deal on me and basically said, "Take it. You have six 
12 years to pay it off." I said, "What if sweeten the deal, and 
13 if we paid it off sooner, could some of this stuff be dropped 
14 or go away?" 
15 Q. Okay, and that was negotiated with Mr. Nakamura — 
16 A. There was no negotiation. It was a suggestion that I 
17 put to him and he put to you folks. 
18 Q. And we — those suggestions were made before your 
19 hearing date? 
20 A. No, the day of the hearing. 
21 Q. The day of the hearing? 
22 A. The day of the hearing in the conference room outside. 
23 Q. Okay, and they had never been raised before then? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Okay, and so when Mr. Nakamura gave you the plea 
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1 negotiation, it included that even though it was your idea? 
2 A. It didn't include that, because it was added that 
3 morning. 
4 Q. I thought you said the plea agreement was just dropped 
5 on you — 
6 A. The plea agreement was dropped on me that day, and it 
7 was set for six years. No one said there was a three-year 
8 statute, and I asked to counter — I guess that's the verbiage 
9 — counter the deal, that one year, or sweeten the deal would 
10 be if I paid it off by the end of 2003, if — I believe it was 
11 at the end of 2008 — would be reduced to four Class A's, and 
12 this would be reduced to one Class A. 
13 Q. And that had not been negotiated before that day? 
14 A. Not to my understanding. It was that morning. 
15 Q. Even though it was in the typewritten text in the plea 
16 negot — plea agreement? 
17 A. I don't recall that. We argued about it all that 
18 morning. I was prepared to walk out of here and go to trial 
19 that morning. 
20 Q. So if I were to tell you that the typewritten plea 
21 agreement includes that, you wouldn't believe that that was 
22 negotiated beforehand? 
23 A. It could have been typed afterwards, because I believe 
24 that we'd have to listen to the tapes. That there was a rough 
25 draft. I initialed down the side of the rough draft, and the 
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1 completed copy was done after the fact. So that was added that 
2 morning and typed later — 
3 Q. In fact, the changes that were made were actually 
4 handwritten on this document, weren't they? 
5 A. I was given a rough draft that morning, and the 
6 complete agreement was done after that hearing. That was my 
7 understanding. 
8 Q. But you signed the document in Court that day with no 
9 changes? 
10 A. It was a rough draft with initials down the list. 
11 That's what I remember. 
12 Q. Okay, but that's the document you signed? 
13 A. Pardon me? 
14 Q. That was the document you signed? 
15 A. That included that adjustment, correct. 
16 Q. Okay, but that wasn't handwritten. That had been 
17 typed in? 
18 A. My understanding was handwritten in, and the full 
19 agreement was typed in later. 
20 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, do you have a copy of the 
21 plea agreement? I don't have the Court's copy, but all of my 
22 amendments are handwritten, and these particular ones are not, 
23 and it only goes to the allegation the defendant did not have 
24 prior notice. Those negotiations had been entered into prior 
25 to this time, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Where am I to look on this? 
2 MR. THOMAS: I would look — there was a handwritten 
3 change on a page that sets forth the — if I may approach, sets 
4 forth the restitution amount farther into the document. You 
5 will note the plea of guilty was changed to no contest in 
6 handwriting. 
7 THE COURT: Yeah, that (inaudible). 
8 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, there we go. You'll note the 
9 handwritten notes striking some language there. What the State 
10 is attempting to demonstrate is — and then if you'll flip to 
11 the next page, it does talk about in the second full paragraph 
12 that if this Court comes for review on December 23rd, it sets 
13 forth the agreement that Mr. Schubarth is suggesting, that 
14 he'll actually receive less convictions in that paragraph and 
15 the one after. Those are all typed in. It's a minor point, 
16 just suggesting that defendant in fact was aware and involved 
17 with the plea negotiations prior to that particular day. 
18 That's all I have. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, anything further? 
20 MR. BEASLIN: Well, I just — the plea agreement, 
21 Mr. Schubarth says that if the defendant does not have all of 
22 the restitution paid on or before December 31st 2003, but does 
23 have it paid by or before December 31st, 2008, then the matter 
24 will come before the Court for review in November 2008. That's 
25 what he signed. 
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1 MR. THOMAS: The previous page is where it's the 
2 sweeter deal. The previous page, second paragraph starts — 
3 sets forth — 
4 MR. BEASLIN: Is that this matter? 
5 MR. THOMAS: Right, and it just sets forth — 
6 MR. BEASLIN: Yeah. 
7 MR. THOMAS: — largely the same thing Mr. Schubarth 
8 suggested was that if he pays it off early, he receives a 
9 greater benefit. 
10 MR. BEASLIN: Okay. 
11 MR. THOMAS: The mere point is Mr. Schubarth was 
12 involved with those negotiations beforehand. It wasn't just 
13 dropped on him. It was actually typed into the document. Any 
14 other changes that were made that morning, as clearly indicated 
15 were handwritten changes to the document. 
16 MR. BEASLIN: And it further appears that those are 
17 related to 1 to 13, 14 to 26, but 27, 8 and 9 — well, 27 to 30 
18 — the four of those you were talking about? 
19 MR. THOMAS: Right, yes. 
20 MR. BEASLIN: The four are the ones that he pled to. 
21 MR. THOMAS: Right. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: And would be sentenced on as I understand 
23 the agreement; is that true? 
24 MR. THOMAS: Correct. 
25 MR. BEASLIN: Okay. I believe that's all, your Honor. 
-55-
1 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anything further, then, 
2 Mr. Beaslin? 
3 MR. BEASLIN: No, that's all I have, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, anything? 
5 MR. THOMAS: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Argument? 
7 MR. THOMAS: I'll reserve. 
8 MR. BEASLIN: Well, I believe you have the facts, 
9 your Honor. So I think that you can interpret those from 
10 what Mr. Schubarth has said here today, and also the fact that 
11 (inaudible) he was in fact incarcerated he did pay what would 
12 be the $22,800, which was the first payment, but the same was 
13 late. It was $22,880, actually, but subsequent to that, then, 
14 his inability to pay was because he was incarcerated on August 
15 the 29th and has not been out of jail since then. So there's 
16 been no opportunity for him to pay, your Honor. 
17 MR. THOMAS: All right. As to each allegation the 
18 defendant did not timely pay, the State is only relying on 
19 that first payment. It was — initially the first payment was 
20 — that he made was $10,000 later than the six months only by 
21 two days. That's not anything to worry about. However, the 
22 balance of that was approximately two months late. It was a 
23 concern of the State's, and I do believe it's a violation of 
24 the agre ement. 
25 As to the cease and desist order, he was issued a 
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1 cease and desist order out of Nevada and charged with a bad 
2 check. The State understands that they didn't present any 
3 evidence as to the outcome of those things, but the conduct 
4 is concerning because of the nature of the charges in Utah. 
5 Most significantly, though, I think if you look at the 
6 final allegation, and that was the fact that he had been bound 
7 over. That means that he met a probable cause standard in the 
8 State of Nevada, that he committed new offenses. The Court is 
9 well aware that the standard for an order to show cause is just 
10 preponderance of evidence. So the State would allege or argue 
11 that it has met its burden, and would ask the Court to enter 
12 all of the pleas against the defendant. 
13 THE COURT: As to the Court? 
14 MR. THOMAS: No, as to all of them. 
15 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. 
16 MR. THOMAS: If he's not in compliance with the plea 
17 in abeyance, the State would ask that all of the pleas enter 
18 against the defendant. 
19 THE COURT: What about the ones he already pled to? 
20 MR. THOMAS: The ones he already pled to I don't think 
21 are an issue. I think those are dealt with. 
22 THE COURT: As I understand it, Mr. Thomas, your 
23 initial hearing, the one in which we issued the warrant was 
24 just those allegations. You wanted to set this aside because 
25 he was late with his first payment; is that correct? 
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1 MR. THOMAS: That was initially it, but we also had 
2 some difficulty. We knew that there was the investigation 
3 going on. Subsequently we went ahead and made the new 
4 allegations including the bind over on the criminal charges 
5 in Nevada. 
6 There should be a second amended set of allegations, 
1, your Honor, before the Court, and in that second amended it 
8 sets forth the basis for the order to show cause. In paragraph 
9 4A, the defendant did not timely pay his restitution. 4B, the 
10 defendant had been ordered — or served a cease and desist 
11 order in Nevada. Paragraph C, there was a complaint filed for 
12 passing a check without sufficient funds. Paragraph D, there 
13 was an issue — or there was a warrant issued for failure to 
14 appear, and paragraph E, committed the crimes of theft by 
15 false pretenses. At that point we had two counts listed. 
16 Subsequently he's been bound over on four counts. 
17 THE COURT: Well, the Court, hearing the evidence here 
18 this morning would indicate that Mr. Schubarth admitted having 
19 been served the cease and desist order. The cease and desist 
20 order demonstrates a pattern of conduct which concerns the 
21 Court, because that's what happened here in Utah in the present 
22 case. 
23 I'm not going to give a lot — any reliance on the 
24 theft by false pretenses case. He hasn't been convicted yet. 
25 He has a presumption of innocence on that. There is an aura, 
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1 a penumbra of Mr. Schubarth's pattern of conduct, though, and 
2 that is — that does concern the Court. 
3 I'm not going to use that for a basis. He did violate 
4 a law. He wrote a bad check and was apparently satisfied that 
5 in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court, and he did not make the 
6 payment of $22,880 on the due date. It took him another 
7 substantial time period to come up with the balance, and that 
8 alone would be a violation of the plea in abeyance. We better 
9 get it violated right up front. 
10 I' 11 order that the plea in abeyance be violated, and 
11 that the counts pled to, the no contest counts be taken off the 
12 shelf and entered. I'll order a report from Adult Probation 
13 and Parole. We'll set this for sentencing. Give us a date. 
14 COURT CLERK: How far out? 
15 THE COURT: Sixty days, probably. 
16 COURT CLERK: March 30th. 
17 THE COURT: March 30th. Do you want to withdraw those 
18 exhibits? 
19 MR. THOMAS: Yes, if I may. Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. We're in recess. 
21 (Hearing concluded.) 
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